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ARTICLE VI OF THE FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE: WITNESSES
An integral part of evidence law consists of rules relating
to witnesses, including those rules governing the form and
scope of the examination by which testimony is elicited and
credibility is impeached. The Federal Rules of Evidence
promulgated by the Supreme Court1 dealing with witnesses
2
underwent substantial Congressional alteration. The purpose
of this comment is to analyze the theoretical and conceptual
foundations of the most significant provisions in Article V1
3 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence enacted by Congress, giving
appropriate reference to constitutional considerations which
were purposefully left open. 4 The discussion will be developed
with a view to illustrate the need for reform and codification
of Louisiana evidentiary precepts.
Examination of Witnesses
Scope of Cross-Examination
Commentators have labeled cross-examination the most
effective device yet developed for exposing defects in tes-
timony;5 it is a safeguard of such magnitude that its denial
has constitutional implications in criminal cases 6 and sig-
nificant consequences in civil trials. 7 While complete denial of
the right of cross-examination is constitutionally precluded,
1. See Van Pelt, Symposium-The Federal Rules of Evidence-
Introduction, 36 LA. L. REV. 66, 67 (1975).
2. FED. R. EVID. 601-15 (1975).
3. Considerations of space preclude a thorough discussion of all the rules
contained in Article VI. Not discussed are Rules 601 (abrogation of any
general competency requirement with deference to state law in certain
cases), 602 (requirement of personal knowledge), 603-04 (oath requirement),
605-06 (special incompetency rules for judge and juror), 614 (calling and
interrogation of witnesses by the court), and 615 (exclusion of witnesses).
4. FED. R. EVID. 402. See also FED. R. EVID. 402, 611(b), Adv. Comm.
Notes.
5. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 at 32 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 5 WIGMORE]. But see C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 31 at 63 (Cleary
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See, e.g., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968);
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
7. See MCCORMICK § 19. The denial may only result in the exclusion of
the evidence adduced on direct, but in a proper case, may result in reversal.
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the court generally has discretionary control over the form
and scope of questioning during cross-examination. 8
Varying considerations have led to disagreement over the
proper scope of cross-examination.9 The broad rule, embraced
by Louisiana and a minority of jurisdictions, permits cross-
examination on any relevant issue;1 0 the narrow rule, vari-
ously formulated, 1 limits the inquiry on cross-examination to
matters elicited on direct examination and to those affecting
the witness's credibility. 12 The divergence of opinion illus-
trates that neither mode of cross-examination is without dis-
advantages.13
As presented to Congress, Rule 611(b) embraced the
broad rule of cross-examination, precipitating a substantial
split in both Houses. 1 4 Eventually Congress amended the
proposed Rule to return to the narrow rule, 5 but gave a trial
judge discretion to permit inquiry into additional matters "as
if on direct examination.' 6 Congress believed that allowing
the trial judge discretion would provide sufficient flexibility
to meet the necessities of trial. 7
8. FED. R. EVID. 611(a); MCCORMICK § 19. See State v. Johnson, 249 La.
950, 192 So. 2d 135 (1966) (judge has full authority to control questioning).
9. Carlson, Scope of Cross-Examination and the Proposed Federal Rules,
32 FED. B. J. 244 (1973); Symposium on the Proposed Federal Rules of Evi-
dence: Part I, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1077, 1242 (1969).
10. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 15:280 (1950), renumbered by La. Acts 1966, No. 311,
§ 2: "When a witness has been intentionally sworn and has testified to any
single fact in his examination in chief, he may be cross-examined upon the
whole case." See also MCCORMICK § 21 at 47.
11. See generally MCCORMICK § 21.
12. A third view, now almost obsolete, allows cross-examination to ex-
tend to any matters except the cross-examiner's affirmative case, such as the
defendant's affirmative defenses or cross-claims. MCCORMICK § 21 at 48.
13. Symposium on the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: Part 1, 15
WAYNE L. REV. 1077, 1242 (1969).
14. See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, COMMENTARIES ON RULES OF
EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS & MAGISTRATES 611[01] (1975)
[hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN & BERGER]. The Supreme Court version
provided: "A witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any
issue in the case, including credibility. In the interests of justice, the judge
may limit cross-examination with respect to matters not testified to on direct
examination." Fed. R. Evid. 611(b) (Sup. Ct. Draft 1972).
15. FED. R. EVID. 611(b): "Cross-examination should be limited to the
subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibil-
ity of the witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry
into additional matters as if on direct examination."
16. Id.
17. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, S.
REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1974).
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However, close scrutiny of the traditional justifications
offered for the narrow rule reveals its lack of foundation. One
justification for the narrow rule is that since a party vouches
for the credibility of his witness, cross-examination should
not be permitted beyond those matters for which the witness
was originally called.'8 However, Rule 60719 expressly rejects
the vouching concept and thus provides no support for the
narrow rule of cross-examination contained in the Rules.
When counsel cross-examines he is permitted to utilize the
advantageous device of the leading question. 20 If he inquires
about matters not covered in the direct examination, propo-
nents 21 of the narrow rule argue that counsel will be allowed
to use leading questions to elicit testimony which he would
otherwise have been forced to adduce during direct examina-
tion where the use of leading questions is generally pre-
cluded.22 However, their argument is more properly con-
cerned with the propriety of the use of leading questions to
elicit evidence from a witness who may be subject to sugges-
tion and can be adequately answered by judicious application
of the rules on leading questions.23 For example, if a witness's
relation to the cross-examiner is such that a leading question
might unduly influence the witness, the court should require
that the cross-examination proceed without the aid of leading
questions.2
Finally, proponents of the narrow rule argue that it pro-
motes orderly presentation of the evidence, and that a con-
trary rule would lessen the impact and persuasiveness of
direct examination. 25 Although this contention has merit, it
appears outweighed by other considerations. The overwhelm-
ing doctrinal support which the broad rule of cross-
18. FED. R. EVID. 611(b), Adv. Comm. Note.
19. FED. R. EVID. 607: "The credibility of a witness may be attacked by
any party, including the party calling him." See text beginning at note 75,
infra.
20. MCCORMICK § 6 at 9.
21. Wigmore summarizes the arguments of those favoring the narrow
rule at 6 J. WIGMORE EVIDENCE § 1887 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as 6
WIGMORE].
22. See note 39, infra.
23. FED. R. EVID. 611(c). See note 37, infra.
24. Normally, however, either the witness will be aligned with the ad-
verse party or hostility can be shown so that the leading question would not
be objectionable even though the cross-examiner is, in effect, conducting a
direct examination.
25. 6 WIGMORE § 1887 at 537-38; Symposium on the Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence: Part I, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1077, 1241 (1969).
1975]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
examination enjoys stems principally from its potential to
effectively reveal truth and from its avoidance of unneces-
sary delay.26 The concern for orderly presentation of the evi-
dence which the narrow rule promotes appears an accommo-
dation to the advocate; counsel brings out only what he wants
the trier of fact to hear. The result is an impediment to
justice since relevant facts upon which an intelligent verdict
should be based are often omitted. Although orderly presen-
tation of evidence undoubtedly aids the jury, 27 conservation
of judicial time and energy is a strong countervailing consid-
eration. The broad rule leaves little room for dispute or tech-
nical haggling over its application, while these results are
inescapable collateral effects of the narrow rule. 28
In evaluating the proper scope of cross-examination a
distinction should perhaps be made between criminal and
civil trials. In a criminal trial when the accused testifies, the
extent to which he waives his privilege against self-
incrimination concerning matters not elicited on direct
examination is a relevant inquiry.29 Some judicial language
intimates that under the fifth amendment his waiver extends
only to the subject matter of his testimony on direct exami-
nation3 0 and regardless of the lack of a definitive resolution of
26. 6 WIGMORE § 1888; Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U.
PA. L. REV. 166 (1940) [hereinafter cited as Credibility Tests]; The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971 Term-Evidence, 32 LA. L. REV.
345 (1972), reprinted in G. PUGH, LOUISIANA EVIDENCE LAW 91 (1974). Cf.
MCCORMICK § 27. Numerous letters were sent to the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee advocating the adoption of the broad rule. Hearings on H.R. 5463
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary on Federal Rules of Evidence, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. at 363-89 (1974). See also LA. R.S. 15:280 (1950), renumbered by La.
Acts 1966, No. 311, § 2.
27. But under the broad rule, the court in the exercise of sound judicial
discretion can control the trial so as to keep the issues clear for the jury. Of
course, when the case is tried by the court without a jury this is not an
important factor.
28. Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary on Federal
Rules of Evidence, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1974).
29. The privilege against self-incrimination does not insulate the accused
from "matters he has himself put in dispute." Brown v. United States, 356
U.S. 148, 156 (1958). See also Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304 (1900);
Tucker v. United States, 5 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. .1925). Cf. State v. Kaufman, 211
La. 517, 30 So. 2d 337 (1947).
30. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155-56 (1958); Fitzpatrick v.
United States, 178 U.S. 304, 316 (1900); Tucker v. United States, 5 F.2d 818,
824 (8th Cir. 1925). See Carlson, Cross-Examination of the Accused, 52 COR-
NELL L.Q. 705 (1967); Note, 45 N.C. L. REV. 1030 (1967). But cf. United States
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this question, sound policy may dictate this conclusion. Al-
though the narrow rule applied to the accused-witness would
equally result in suppression of relevant evidence, if the de-
fendant's testimony is crucial to a particular issue but the
application of the broad rule dissuades him from testifying, it
seems the need for the testimony should outweigh the re-
straint put on the prosecution. 3 1
In any event, the extent of an accused's waiver of his fifth
amendment rights should not justify a general restrictive
rule applicable in all cases. The narrow rule is not only
theoretically unsound, but its application results in unfortu-
nate practical effects. 32 The narrow rule may simply postpone
and delay the eventual introduction of evidence; 33 further-
more, the rule may exclude relevant testimony where the
witness has a privilege not to be called by the opponent.34 In
summary, the narrow rule seems inconsistent with the gen-
eral theme of the Federal Rules favoring admissibility and
may result in significant restraint on the ascertainment of
truth.35
Form of Questions
Concomitant with its inherent powers over the trial,
under the Federal Rules the court has discretion to control
v. Pate, 357 F.2d 911, 915-16 (7th Cir. 1966); State v. Cripps, 259 La. 403,
429-30, 250 So. 2d 382, 392 (1971); State v. Kaufman, 211 La. 517, 535-36, 30 So.
2d 337, 343 (1947). The same constitutional problems could arise if the judge
permits the prosecution to proceed to cross-examine the defendant "as if on
direct."
31. The court in Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940-41 (D.C. Cir.
1967), clarifying Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965), consid-
ered this an important factor to be assessed by the trial court in determining
whether the accused should be impeached by prior convictions. See note 117,
infra. Cf. State v. Thomas, 208 La. 548, 23 So. 2d 212 (1945) (defendant has the
right to take the stand out of the presence of the jury for the limited purpose
of testifying to the involuntariness of a confession and not be subject to
cross-examination upon the whole case).
32. See MCCORMICK § 23.
33. The plaintiff may escape a directed verdict only to lose his case when
the damning testimony is educed in his opponent's case.
34. "Thus, the privilege of the accused, and of the spouse of the accused,
not to be called by the state in a criminal case may prevent the prosecutor
from eliciting the new facts at a later stage, if he cannot draw them out on
cross-examination." MCCORMICK § 23 at 51. See LA. R.S. 15:461(2) (1950).
35. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 611[02] at 29.
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the form of questions asked by counsel.38 However, due to
their importance, the Federal Rules expressly treat use of
leading questions. 37 The objectionable feature of leading
questions is that they suggest to the witness the answer
sought by the examiner.38 That a witness is friendly to the
direct examiner, and that he may, for that reason, be recep-
tive to prompting is assumed; consequently, in Louisiana and
other jurisdictions use of leading questions is prohibited in
direct examination.39 However, when a witness is cross-
examined by opposing counsel, there is less likelihood that he
will acquiesce to inaccurate or misleading proposals, thus,
leading questions are usually proper.
Circumstances may arise which require exceptional
treatment. If exclusion of leading questions substantially di-
minishes the ability of counsel to elicit relevant evidence on
direct examination, their prohibition is outweighed by the
fact-finder's need for the evidence. Such circumstances are
presented if the witness's memory is exhausted, the witness
is a young child or an adult with communication problems, or
the questions deal with undisputed preliminary matters. 40
36. FED. R. EVID. 611(a): "The court shall exercise reasonable control
over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence
so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascer-
tainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect
witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment." See State v. Johnson,
249 La. 950, 192 So. 2d 135 (1966) (judge has full authority to control question-
ing); MCCORMICK § 5 at 8.
37. FED. R. EVID. 611(c): "Leading questions should not be used on the
direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop his
testimony. Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross-
examination. When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a
witness identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading
questions." Although the Rule is not absolutely clear, if the conditions of Rule
611(c) are met, leading questions should be allowed despite the fact that the
examination is proceeding "as if on direct" pursuant to Rule 611(b). See State
v. Fallon, 290 So. 2d 273 (La. 1974) (the court has discretion to limit or allow
leading questions).
38. Denroche, Leading Questions, 6 CRIM. L.Q. 21, 22 (1963); Symposium
on the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: Part 1, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1077,
1244 (1969).
39. LA. R.S. 15:277 (1950), renumbered by La. Acts 1966, No. 311, § 2: "A
leading question is one which suggests to the witness the answer he is to
deliver, and though framed in the alternative, is inadmissible when pro-
pounded to one's own witness, unless such witness be unwilling or hostile."
See MCCORMICK § 6 at 8-9.
40. FED. R. EVID. 611(c), Adv. Comm. Note.
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Likewise, when cross-examination is in form only, because
the witness to be cross-examined is receptive to the prompt-
ing of the cross-examiner, 41 leading questions should be im-
proper. Federal Rule 611(c) accommodates these considera-
tions by giving the court limited discretion to permit use of
leading questions on direct examination if "necessary to de-
velop the testimony" 42 or if hostility is actually shown,4 and
to prohibit their use on cross-examination. 44
Rule 611(c) also permits leading questions on direct
examination when a "party calls an adverse party or a wit-
ness identified with an adverse party"45 and thus apparently
represents a broadened concept for civil cases. Statutes au-
thorizing leading questions under these circumstances are
often drafted narrowly to restrict the application of the excep-
tion to those witnesses who as agents of the party have a
specified connexity with the matter in controversy. 46 The
approach incorporated in the Federal Rules, however, should
discourage a restricted, mechanistic application and will ide-
ally be broadly construed to promote the search for truth.
The most progressive element of Rule 611(c) is its in-
novative application of the "adverse party" rule to criminal
cases. 47 The rule cannot be used against the accused since he
41. E.g., Montgomery v. City of New Orleans, 266 So. 2d 482 (4th Cir.
1972) ("A party may be cross-examined by his own counsel only in those
circumstances permitted by law, [such] as when there is proof of hostility.")
Cf. Rancatore v. Evans, 182 So. 2d 102 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966) (if the
defendant-insured is in actuality aligned with the plaintiff, the cross-
examination of the insured by the plaintiff can not be used against the
defendant-insurer).
42. See note 37, supra.
43. The Advisory Committee believed that the phrase "necessary to de-
velop the testimony" was sufficiently broad to provide for hostility. However,
Congress added the reference to hostility to clarify that it was a permissible
exception. SEN. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SEN. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 26 (1974).
44. FED. R. EVID. 611(c) provides: "Ordinarily leading questions should
be permitted on cross-examination" (emphasis added). Leading questions
may not be permitted where the cross-examination is in form only, and not in
fact. FED. R. EVID. 611(c), Adv. Comm. Note.
45. Such a class of people consists of those who can be presumed hostile
as opposed to those witnesses whose actual hostility must be shown. See note
43, supra.
46. E.g., LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1634 provides in part: "'Representative'
means an officer, agent or employee having supervision or knowledge of
the matter in controversy, in whole or in part ......
47. The Supreme Court draft provided in part: "In civil cases, a party is
1975]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
has a constitutional privilege not to be called by the prosecu-
tion.4 However, when the rule is otherwise sought to be
utilized, difficulty may arise in determining which witnesses
are aligned with an adverse party within the meaning of Rule
611(c). The Senate Committee Report noted that "the rule
should be applied with caution. '49 Nonetheless, the final ver-
sion of Rule 611(c) reflects sound policy by giving the court
discretion to control interrogation of witnesses, thereby en-
hancing the fact-finding process and decreasing the extent to
which each side is forced to rely on the other to call wit-
nesses. 50 Such an approach merges well with the abolition of
the voucher rule in Rule 607.51
Refreshing Recollection
The technique of refreshing memory entails a witness's
inspection of memoranda 52 dealing withothe particular experi-
ences to be recalled, thereby affording a witness opportunity
to revive his faded memory. However, the memorandum may
so influence the witness that he will testify in reliance upon it
rather than upon his refreshed memory.53 In order to protect
entitled to call an adverse party or witness identified with him and interro-
gate by leading questions .... " Fed. R. Evid. 611(c) (Sup. Ct. Draft 1972).
"The [House Judiciary] Committee . . . substituted the word 'When' for the
phrase 'In civil cases' to reflect the possibility that in criminal cases a defen-
dant may be entitled to call witnesses identified with the government . .. ."
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 12
(1973).
48. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Cf. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
49. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 26 (1974).
50. Note also that FED. R. EVID. 806 provides in part: "If the party
against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the declarant as
a witness, the party is entitled to examine him on the statement as if under
cross-examination."
51. See note 76, infra.
52. Although some court rules are more stringent, the majority of juris-
dictions follow the traditional view that "any memorandum or other object
may be used as a stimulus to present memory, without restriction by rule as
to authorship, guaranty of correctness, or time of making." MCCORMICK § 9 at
16. Accord, LA. R.S. 15:279 (1950), renumbered by La. Acts 1966, No. 311, § 2.
See State v. Holloway, 274 So. 2d 699 (La. 1973) (use of a memorandum
apparently containing a mug shot); State v. Barnes, 257 La. 1017, 245 So. 2d
159 (1971) (use of another's memorandum); State v. Terrell, 175 La. 758, 144
So. 488 (1932) (use of stenographer's notes).
53. The danger is two-fold: (1) the witness might "remember" something
[Vol. 36
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against potential abuse, the court should balance the likeli-
hood that the memorandum will actually refresh the wit-
ness's memory against the possibility of undue suggestion
and should prohibit the memorandum's use if the danger of
improper suggestion outweighs its probable value.
54
Another safeguard against the misuse of memoranda
used to refresh memory is the right of opposing counsel to
inspect the memorandum in order to determine its actual
capacity to refresh recollection and to discover possible in-
consistencies bearing upon the witness's credibility. 55 In
Louisiana, as in most other jurisdictions, the right of inspec-
tion is extended only to those writings used while testifying.56
Federal Rule 612 reflects the same view, but with the mod-
ification that when the writing i used to refresh recollection
before taking the stand, the court may compel production to
allow inspection if the interests of justice will be served. 57
that never really occurred, or (2) the witness's memory might not actually be
"refreshed," in which case the writing itself becomes the actual evidence, and
must fall within the recorded recollection exception to the hearsay rule in
order to be admissible.
54. E.g., State v. Tharp, 284 So. 2d 536, 541-42 (La. 1973); MCCORMICK § 9.
55. MCCORMICK § 9 at 17.
56. State v. Tharp, 284 So. 2d 536 (La. 1973). The court's opinion was
ambiguous as to the extent of the inspection right. However, subsequent
cases fixed the line at the witness stand. See State v. Perkins, 310 So. 2d 591
(La. 1975); State v. Lane, 302 So. 2d 880 (La. 1974); State v. Payton, 294 So. 2d
211 (La. 1974). See also cases cited in MCCORMICK § 9 at 17 n.59.
57. FED. R. EVID. 612: "Except as otherwise provided in criminal pro-
ceedings by section 3500 of title 18, United States Code, if a witness uses a
writing to refresh his memory for the purpose of testifying, either-(1) while
testifying, or (2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it
is necessary in the interests of justice, an adverse party is entitled to have
the writing produced at the hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine the
witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence those portions which relate to
the testimony of the witness. If it is claimed that the writing contains mat-
ters not related to the subject matter of the testimony the court shall
examine the writing in camera, excise any portions not so related, and order
delivery of the remainder to the party entitled thereto. Any portion withheld
over objections shall be preserved and made available to the appellate court
in the event of an appeal. If a writing is not produced or delivered pursuant
to order under this rule, the court shall make any order justice requires,
except that in criminal cases when the prosecution elects not to comply, the
order shall be one striking the testimony or, if the court in its discretion
determines that the interests of justice so require, declaring a mistrial"




Congress manifested concern that an attorney's work product
or other privileged matter might become the object of a
fishing expedition launched under a non-discretionary rule.58
However, the requirement that the production of memoranda
used by the witness be "for the purpose of testifying"5 9 seems
adequate to have prevented such imposition.
6 0
If a witness refers to the writing immediately before tak-
ing the stand, the court, in its discretion, should prevent the
slight temporal difference from becoming a means to evade
the Rule.6 1 The danger of undue suggestion is always present,
regardless of when the witness refers to the memorandum,
and the presence of this danger alone should persuade the
court in its discretion to compel production when there are no
countervailing considerations. 62
Federal Rule 612 is subjected expressly to the Jencks
Act, 63 which provides for production of "statements"6 4 made
58. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973). The original Advis-
ory Committee draft of Rule 612 made no distinction as to the time when the
witness referred to the writing.
59. See note 57, supra.
60. FED. R. EVID. 612, Adv. Comm. Note: "The purpose of the phrase 'for
the purpose of testifying' is to safeguard against using the rule as a pretext
for wholesale exploration of an opposing party's files and to insure that
access is limited only to those writings which may fairly be said in fact to
have an impact upon the testimony of the witness."
61. Phillips, A Comparative Study of the Witness Rules in the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence and in Tennessee Law, 39 TENN. L. REV. 379, 400
(1972).
62. See text at note 58, supra. See also MCCORMICK § 9 at 17-18; 3 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 762 at 140 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
3 WIGMORE].
63. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1957). See text of Rule 612 at note 57, supra. 18
U.S.C. § 3500(a) provides: "In any criminal prosecution brought by the United
States, no statement or report in the possession of the United States which
was made by a government witness . . . shall be the subject of subpoena,
discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on direct examination
in the trial of the case."
64. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) provides: "The term 'statement,' as used in subsec-
tions (b), (c), and (d) of this section in relation to any witness called by the
United States, means-(1) a written statement made by said witness and
signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him; (2) a stenographic, mechani-
cal, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a sub-
stantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said witness and
recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral statement; or (3) a
statement, however taken or recorded, or a transcription thereof, if any,
made by said witness to a grand jury." The restrictive definition of "state-
ment" does not apply to the general prohibition of subsection (a).
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by government witnesses in a federal criminal case. In
Palermo v. United States,65 the United States Supreme Court
held that statements of government witnesses not subject to
production under the terms of the Jencks Act are immune
from all other production requirements. Palermo apparently
remains viable under Rule 612.66 Since under the Jencks Act
statements need not have been consulted "for the purpose of
testifying"6 7 in order to compel production, the availability of
statements under the Act appears broader than that au-
thorized by Federal Rule 612. Yet, where a statement used by
a government witness to refresh his memory does not fall
within the purview of the Jencks Act, Palermo may necessar-
ily preclude the efficacy of Rule 612.65 If Rule 612 is so con-
strued, the accused would be unduly restricted. For example,
a government agent's memorandum of a witness's statement
used by the government agent on the stand to refresh his
memory could not be produced, thereby potentially depriving
the defendant of valuable impeaching evidence.
Impeachment
In accordance with the approach of the Uniform Rules6
9
and the Model Code of Evidence, 70 the Federal Rules do not
comprehensively treat impeachment or rehabilitation.
7 1
65. 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
66. FED. R. EVID. 612, Adv. Comm. Note: "Items falling within the pur-
view of the statute are producible only as provided by its terms, Palermo v.
United States, 360 U.S. 343, 351 (1959), and disclosure under the rule is
limited similarly by the statutory conditions."
67. Text of FED. R. EVID. 612 in note 57, supra. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b): "After
a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination, the
court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce
any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the
United States which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has
testified. If the entire contents of any such statement relate to the subject
matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order it to be delivered
directly to the defendant for his examination and use" (emphasis added).
68. However, when the material used by the witness is not his statement,
as for example, a diagram, then Palermo does not apply and Rule 612 gov-
erns.
69. UNIFORM RuLEs OF EVID. 19-22 (1953).
70. MODEL CODE EviD. rule 106 (1942).
71. The only area comprehensively covered is impeachment by use of
character evidence, including convictions. FED. R. EVID. 608-09. Other areas
treated are the foundation requirements for impeachment by prior inconsis-
tent statements (Rule 613), and the inadmissibility of religious beliefs and
19751
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These subjects 72 must be treated by reference to the general
policy of the Federal Rules favoring full admissibility of rel-
evant evidence unless exclusion is dictated by legal or policy
reasons. 73 Proffered evidence should be analyzed in light of
its probative value, and counsel should be required to explain
how the evidence is relevant to credibility rather than sup-
port its admission through mechanistic application of tradi-
tional rules. 74
Impeachment of One's Own Witness
Commentators have long advocated abrogation of the
traditional rule against impeaching one's own witness;75 the
Federal Rules adopt their philosophy in Rule 607.76 Though
the voucher rule may have had merit in its beginnings, 77 in
the modern adversary process one rarely can choose his wit-
nesses, and therefore a party cannot in fact usually hold out
his witnesses as worthy of belief. A rule which prevents the
calling party from impeaching his own witness leaves him at
the mercy of the witness and his adversary. The disadvan-
tageous effect of the traditional voucher rule outweighs the
opinions "for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature" credibil-
ity is impaired (Rule 610). See MCCORMICK § 48.
72. The traditional methods of impeachment omitted are bias, defects in
capacity to observe or recollect, and contradiction. See MCCORMICK §§ 40, 45,
47.
73. FED. R. EVID. 102, 401, 611(a); WEINSTEIN & BERGER 607[02]; Credi-
bility Tests at 167.
74. Traditionally impeachment evidence was excluded if it was classified
as "collateral." Under the suggested approach the court must balance the
probative value of the evidence against its impact on the jury in light of the
circumstances of the particular trial; the court cannot merely justify its
ruling by a label. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 607[06] at 607. Balancing the
value of evidence against its risk should eliminate many artificial rules which
developed in connection with impeachment by inconsistent statements. For
example, the court should not concern itself with determining the presence of
a sufficient degree of inconsistency in a prior statement; it should admit the
statement if on balance it is helpful to the trier of fact. MCCORMICK § 34 at 69;
WEINSTEIN & BERGER 607[06].
75. See, e.g., MCCORMICK § 38 at 77; 3A WIGMORE §§ 896-918 (Chadbourn
rev. 1970); Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New Developments, 4 U.
CHI. L. REV. 69, 96 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Ladd]. Louisiana still adheres
to the traditional voucher rule. See LA. R.S. 15:487 (1950).
76. FED. R. EVID. 607: "The credibility of a witness may be attacked by
any party, including the party calling him."
77. See Ladd at 69-75.
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objection that permitting impeachment of one's own witness
may permit a party to coerce his witness to give testimony
favorable to his client by threatening to reveal embarrassing
character evidence to impeach him if he refuses. 78 In addi-
tion, the existence of numerous exceptions to the traditional
voucher rule raises doubts about its soundness.7 9 The United
States Supreme Court in Chambers v. Mississippis ° cast seri-
ous doubt on the constitutional validity of the old voucher
rule at least insofar as its application denies an accused the
right to present a defense. Apart from the policy reasons
which favor rejection of the traditional ban against im-
peachment of one's own witness, impairment of the truth-
finding process which results from its application alone ap-
pears sufficient to justify its abolition.8 '
Rule 607 represents a change more in emphasis than in
effect, since the traditional exceptions to the ban against
impeaching one's own witness often permitted the same re-
sult which will obtain under the new Federal Rule.8 2 Fur-
thermore, a number of impeachment methods sanctioned by
the Federal Rules are available only on cross-examina-
tion.8 3 Since the jury often looks unfavorably upon attacks
78. MCCORMICK § 38; WEINSTEIN & BERGER 607[01]; Symposium on the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: Part I, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1077, 1263-67
(1969). It has forcibly been argued that even the fear of having one's character
exposed in public is not an effective coercive device. The coercion theory
"assumes that all witnesses who give destructive testimony to the party who
calls them, are testifying to the truth," and this is a false premise. Ladd at
85.
79. The voucher rule is relaxed in several situations: United States v.
Hicks, 420 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1970) (where the calling party is surprised by the
witness); United States v. Browne, 313 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1963) (where the
judge calls the witness); United States v. Freeman, 302 F.2d 347 (2d Cir. 1962)
(where the accused calls a government agent); FED: R. CIV. P. art. 32(a)(1)
(where a witness in a civil case contradicts testimony given in a deposition);
LA. CODE OF CIV. P. art. 1634 (where the adverse party is called as a witness
in civil cases). See generally WEINSTEIN & BERGER 607101].
80. 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (totality of the circumstances denied the defen-
dant due process by depriving him of a fair opportunity to present a defense).
81. Under Rule 607 "[t]he witness is no longer a partisan object to be
defended by one party and attacked by the other. He becomes an instrument
of the Court, and every relevant fact may be elicited from him, without rules
which tend to conceal some aspects of testimony." Symposium on the Pro-
posed Federal Rules of Evidence: Part I, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1077, 1284-85
(1969).
82. See note 79, supra.




against one's own witness, and since ideally the necessity for
impeachment of one's own witness will seldom arise,8 4 the
new Federal Rule should have limited effect in practice.
Despite the arguments favoring the relaxed 'rule, which
permits a calling party to impeach his own witness, the possi-
bility exists that Rule 607 will be misused as a vehicle to get
hearsay before the jury. 5 When prior inconsistent state-
ments are used to impeach a witness, a possibility always
exists that the jury will give them substantive weight. As
originally promulgated by the Supreme Court, Rule 801(d) (1)
(A) excepted prior inconsistent statements from the definition
of hearsay, and was thus consistent with Rule 607, which
authorizes impeachment of one's own witness by prior incon-
sistent statements. Simply stated, under the original federal
scheme no hearsay problem existed. However, Congress sub-
sequently changed the Supreme Court's version of Rule
801(d) (1) (A) and provided that prior inconsistent statements
not made under oath are hearsay. 8 Pretermitting a discus-
sion of the merits of Congress's amendment, the change ap-
parently reflects the judgment that prior inconsistent state-
ments not given under oath are inherently unreliable. The
resulting inconsistency is unfortunate, as it 'places the ac-
cused in the position of possibly being convicted on evidence
Congress decreed to be too untrustworthy for substantive
use, if the jury in fact uses the impeaching statement sub-
stantively.
In most jurisdictions prior inconsistent statements may
be brought to the attention of the jury if the direct examiner
is surprised 7 or during cross-examination, and arguably an
equivalent opportunity for abuse exists.88 However, in these
situations introduction of a prior statement serves a legiti-
mate impeachment function and is not offered for the sole
purpose of avoiding the hearsay prohibition. The policy
reasons which prompted Congress to prohibit substantive use
of prior statements not given under oath should be equally
84. See Ladd at 69.
85. Absent surprise, when an advocate attempts to impeach his own
witness using prior inconsistent statements, the most obvious inference is
that he is attempting to do indirectly what he can not do directly.86. For a discussion of Rule 801, see Comment, Hearsay Evidence and the
Federal Rules: Article VIII, 36 LA. L. REV. 139, 150 (1975).
87. See McCORMICK § 38 at 76.
88. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 607[01]; Ladd at 85.
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applicable in the impeachment arena, since a jury cannot
sufficiently discriminate between evidence offered solely for
impeachment purposes and evidence intended to be given its
natural probative weight.89 Thus, Rule 607 should be modified
to conform with the policy judgment reflected in Rule
801(d) (1) (A) to limit impeachment by prior inconsistent
statements to cases of surprise where the introduction of the
statement serves a legitimate impeachment function.
Perhaps concern is greater in criminal cases and the best
solution is to restrict the prosecutor's impeachment of his
witnesses by prior inconsistent statements to cases of sur-
prise where the advantages to the truth-finding process
adequately outweigh the danger of a conviction based upon
hearsay.90
Character and Conduct
Though character evidence is of slight probative value,
its impact upon a jury can be devastating.9 1 Consequently, the
Federal Rules generally restrict its use, 92 and where charac-
ter evidence is permitted as an impeachment device, Rule 608
limits the inquiry to the witness's character for truthful-
ness.9 3 The limitation directs the trier's attention to evidence
more probative of credibility, reduces confusion and surprise,
and decreases the unfavorable aspects of testifying.9 4
Traditionally, in Louisiana, as in most jurisdictions, proof
89. Cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
90. Cf. N.J.R. EV. 20 which allows one generally to impeach his own wit-
ness, but not by prior inconsistent statements without surprise.
91. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 608[01].
92. FED. R. EVID. 404(a). See Comment, Determining Relevancy: Article
IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 70, 77 (1975).
93. FED. R. EVID. 608(a): "The credibility of a witness may be attacked or
supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation but subject to these
limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after
the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or
reputation evidence or otherwise." Thus moral character which is of slight
probative value is excluded. But see LA. R.S. 15:490 (1950): "The credibility of
a witness may be attacked generally, by showing that his general reputation
for truth or for moral character is bad, or it may be attacked only in so far as
his credibility in the case on trial is concerned."
94. If a witness had a sordid past and incidents bearing upon that past
were a proper inquiry, the witness would hesitate to take the stand; once
there he could be humiliated.
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of character has been limited to evidence of reputation. 95 The
Federal Rules adopt use of reputation evidence to establish
character and additionally provide that character may be
proved by testimony in the form of personal opinion.9 6 Allow-
ance of personal opinion as a mode of proof of character is
predicated upon its higher degree of reliability in comparison
with reputation testimony.9 7 Since reputation testimony is
often opinion in disguise, it is logical to avoid the use of
indirect evidence when better proof of character is avail-
able.9 Though other reasons support the use of personal opin-
ion testimony,99 proof of character by reputation was retained
since it may be the only method of proof if no witnesses have
sufficient personal contact with the person whose character is
at issue to give a personal opinion.
Recognition that effective cross-examination demands
some allowance for inquiries of a specific nature prompted the
Advisory Committee to incorporate into the Federal Rules a
provision that the character of a witness may be proved by
specific instances of conduct, 00 however, cognizant of the
high risk of prejudice associated with a liberal view, the draft-
ers also incorporated certain safeguards. Of primary impor-
tance is the restriction that such inquiry can only be made on
cross-examination. Furthermore, extrinsic proof of specific
95. LA. R.S. 15:491 (1950): "When the general credibility is attacked, the
inquiry must be limited to general reputation, and can not go into particular
acts, vices or courses of conduct." See MCCORMICK § 44.
96. See note 93, supra.
97. While reputation testimony is the conglomerate judgment of the
community, opinion rests upon personal observation. 7 J. WIGMORE, EVI-
DENCE § 1986 (3d ed. 1940); 120 CONG. REC. 11-548 (Feb. 6, 1974).
98. Credibility Tests at 173.
99. The traditional limitation that one's character could only be estab-
lished by testimony on reputation often worked as a rule of exclusion. In
contemporary society an individual may not remain in one area long enough
to establish a reputation. Hence, a witness having sufficient contacts with
the person whose character he is describing is qualified to express his opinion
as to the person's character and thereby fill this gap.
100. FED. R. EviD. 608(b): "Specific instances of the conduct of a witness,
for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than convic-
tion of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.
They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness
or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1)
concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concern-
ing the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to
which character the witness being cross-examined has testified." Contra LA.
R.S. 15:491 (1950) at note 95, supra.
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instances may not be used, and the court retains wide discre-
tion to prevent abuse. 10' Although the federal scheme should
afford a basis for distinction between an accused or a party-
witness, and other witnesses generally, 0 2 when the advan-
tages of impeachment by specific conduct are weighed against
its deleterious effects, it appears that its exclusion represents
sounder policy.'0 3
Though a witness may not make a partial disclosure of
incriminating evidence and then invoke his privilege against
self-incrimination,' 0 4 "no tenable contention can be made that
merely by testifying he waives his right to foreclose inquiry
on cross-examination into criminal activities for the purpose
of attacking his credibility.' ' 05 Hence, Rule 608 so provides, 0 6
but the Rule states clearly that if criminal activities have an
independent relevance they may be subjects of inquiry. 0 7
Because of the delay a contrary rule would create, 08 Rule
608 prohibits rehabilitation of a witness's character before it
is attacked, 0 9 without clearly indicating what circumstances
101. Id. Additionally, the overriding principles of Rules 403 and 611(a)
should require exclusion if the prejudice or embarrassment is extreme.
102. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 608[05] at 29.
103. Permitting impeachment by proof of past conduct, if construed
broadly, could allow inquiry into past arrests (the Rule does not bar use of
prior convictions) or other prejudicial events. However, the provision should
be construed, especially in a criminal case, to exclude most past acts as either
not probative of truthfulness or too prejudicial. If this is so, it is questionable
whether this method should be authorized at all for impeachment since
specific acts probative of bias or of inconsistency within court declarations
are admissible without reference to Rule 608(b) and without limitation by it.
FED. R. EVID. 401; cf. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 607[03], 613[01]; Phillips, A
Comparative Study of the Witness Rules in the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence and in Tennessee, 39 TENN. L. REv. 379, 392 n.55 (1972).
104. See note 29, supra.
105. FED. R. EVID. 608(b), Adv. Comm. Note.
106. FED. R. EVID. 608(b) provides inter alia: "The giving of testimony,
whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not operate as a waiver
of his privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to
matters which relate only to credibility" (emphasis added). Louisiana neces-
sarily has a similar rule since specific acts, arrests and the like are not
considered proper subjects of inquiry. See LA. R.S. 15:491, 495 (1950).
107. Independent relevance would exist when the criminal acts are pro-
bative of bias, or when evidence of other crimes is admissible to prove an
element of the case in chief. See discussion of Rule 404(b) in Comment,
Determining Relevancy: Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 36 LA. L.
REV. 70, 80 (1975).
108. MCCORMICK § 49 at 102-03 n.73.
109. FED. R. EviD. 608(a)(2): "(E]vidence of truthful character is admis-
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constitute an attack on a witness's character sufficient to
allow his rehabilitation. That oDinion and reputation evi-
dence may be used to attack the credibility of a witness does
not indicate that only when these methods are used is the
witness's character in fact assailed. Therefore, the Advisory
Committee included the phrase "attacked by opinion or repu-
tation evidence or otherwise," intending to provide for excep-
tional situations. 110 Since the "no bolstering" rule is not made
specifically applicable to other modes of impeachment, re-
habilitation principles must be developed by reference to
basic principles of relevancy."'
Conviction of Crime
Prior criminal convictions are a particular kind of charac-
ter evidence used to impeach a witness's credibility. A jury,
however, because of the social stigma attached to a criminal
conviction, may tend to be particularly influenced by its use
as a means of impeachment." 2 Although evidence of a wit-
ness's prior convictions may unduly influence a jury in its
assessment of his credibility in any trial,1 3 impeaching an
accused by his prior convictions works a special hardship. The
fact-finder may use evidence of prior convictions as cir-
cumstantial evidence of guilt of the crime charged, though
the prior criminal conduct may not have been introduced
specifically for this purpose."14 The jury may punish an ac-
sible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked
by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise." Accord, LA. R.S. 15:484
(1950).
110. A general test is "whether evidence of the good character of the
witness or of his consistent statements is logically relevant to explain the
impeaching fact." MCCORMICK § 48 at 103. An earlier Advisory Committee
draft provided that the mere fact of being an accused would constitute a
sufficient attack upon his character to authorize rehabilitation. As worded,
Rule 608(a) could be so construed.
111. See text at note 73, supra. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 608[08].
112. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER 609[02] at 58; Glick, Impeachment by
Prior Convictions: A Critique of Rule 6-09 of the Proposed Rules of Evidence
for U.S. District Courts, 6 CRIM. LAW. BULL. 330, 333 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Glick]; Credibility Tests at 189; Spector, Impeaching the Defendant by
His Prior Convictions and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence:A Half
Step Forward and Three Steps Backward, 1 LOY. L.J. 247 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Spector].
113. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 606[02] at 58.
114. See discussion of FED. R. EVID. 404(b) in Comment, Determining
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cused because he is "bad" regardless of a lack of evidence of
his present guilt.115 To prevent such a result an accused with
a criminal record may refrain from taking the stand in his
own behalf, thereby depriving the trier of fact of relevant
evidence. Use of prior convictions to impeach an accused who
has taken the stand does not appear to violate the Constitu-
tion,116 but considerations of fairness demand that some re-
strictions should be imposed." 7
Aside from the undesirable effects which a rule permit-
ting unqualified use of prior convictions has on an accused-
witness, doubt exists as to the relevance of prior convictions
upon the issue of witness credibility." 8 Commentators agree
that only those crimes which reflect a witness's predisposition
toward mendacity are reasonably relevant to the question of
credibility. 119
Congress, in Federal Rule 609, attempted to reconcile the
need for an effective means to expose unreliable testimony
with the problems of prejudice and relevance inherent in
impeachment with convictions by placing certain restrictions
on their use.120 Crimes involving dishonesty or false state-
ment are particularly probative of credibility and are not
Relevancy: Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 70, 80
(1975).
115. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 609[02] at 58.
116. Cf. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967); State v. Prather, 290 So. 2d
840 (La. 1974). Contra State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971).
117. Louisiana allows any conviction to be used to impeach a witness.
LA. R.S. 15:462 (1950). Various other approaches have been formulated: (1)
complete abrogation of use of prior convictions to impeach (Credibility Tests
at 191; Spector at 247); (2) exclusion left to the court's discretion [Luck v.
United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965)].
118. "While there may be a germ of truth to the basic assumption that
the 'more serious the crime the more depraved (and thus untrustworthy) the
criminal,' there are so many exceptions to such a proposition so as to make it
worthless as a general rule." Glick at 334. See also Credibility Tests at 176;
Spector at 249.
119. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 609[02] at 57; 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 926
(Chadbourn ed. 1970); Credibility Tests at 191; Glick at 335; Spector at 249.
120. FED. R. EviD. 609(a): "For the purpose of attacking the credibility of
a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if
elicited from him or established by public record during cross-examination
but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false state-
ment, regardless of the punishment" (emphasis added).
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subject to exclusion in the court's discretion. 121 The Rule
further provides that all felonies are admissible for impeach-
ment purposes, but insofar as an accused 122 is concerned, only
if the court determines that the probative value of the convic-
tion on the issue of credibility outweighs its prejudicial effect
to him. Rule 609 does not expressly require that the witness
be first afforded an opportunity to admit or deny that he has
been convicted; 23 the Rule authorizes proof on cross-
examination by either interrogation or public record. 12
Rule 609(a) puts the burden 25 on the prosecution to show
that the impeachment value of a prior conviction outweighs
the danger that it will improperly influence the outcome of
the trial by persuading the trier of fact to convict the accused
on the basis of his prior record. 26 Literally, Rule 609(a) could
be construed to require a balancing process when the ac-
cused's witness is on the stand, although this was probably
not the legislative intent.127 However, clearly an accused may
utilize any felony conviction to impeach the prosecution's
witnesses, thereby gaining a distinct advantage.128
Although Rule 609(a) reflects a progressive step in the
121. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 609[03]; H. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 9 (1974).
122. Although Rule 609(a) refers to the "defendant," surely Congress
intended that the balancing approach should only apply to an accused. H.
CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1974): "Such evidence should
only be excluded where it presents a danger of improperly influencing the
outcome of the trial by persuading the trier of fact to convict the defendant
on the basis of his prior criminal record" (emphasis added). In civil cases
there is no rational basis for distinguishing between a plaintiff and defen-
dant to justify such a disparity in treatment.
123. But see SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE, S. REP. NO. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974): "[A] court record of
a prior conviction is admissible to prove that conviction if the witness has
forgotten or denies its existence" (emphasis added).
124. Contra LA. R.S. 15:495 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1952, No. 180,
§ 1 which provides in part: "[B]ut before evidence of such former conviction
can be adduced from any other source than the witness whose credibility is to
be impeached, he must have been questioned on cross-examination as to such
conviction, and have failed distinctly to admit the same .... "
125. Rule 609 grants more protection to an accused than the Luck rule
discussed at note 117, supra. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER 609[03] at 67.
126. H. CONF. REP. NO. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1974).
127. Compare WEINSTEIN & BERGER 609[03] at 66-67 and 120 CONG.
REC. 12254 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) with H. CoNF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 9 (1974).
128. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 609[03]; 120 CONG. REC. 12254 (daily ed. Dec.
18, 1974).
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area of impeachment by convictions, it nonetheless contains
objectionable features. When the witness is neither the ac-
cused nor a witness called by the accused, if the probable
legislative intent is given full effect evidence of prior convic-
tions will be automatically admissible to impeach a witness's
credibility, with the court having no discretion to weigh the
actual risk of prejudice against the conviction's probative
value on the issue of credibility. The net effect is inconsistent
with the general approach of Rules 401 and 403 providing
that evidence is admissible unless excluded because the pro-
bative value is outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. In
addition, the denial of discretion to exclude crimes involving
dishonesty or false statement deprives the court of flexibility
needed to handle exceptional situations. 129 Finally, the
phrase "dishonesty or false statement" can be broadly con-
strued to include all crimes having any substantial relevance
to credibility. 130 Thus, Rule 609(a) should be limited to such
crimes so that only felonies substantially relevant to credibil-
ity could be used to impeach. Such a limitation would reduce
the burden which the present Rule places on the prosecution
and bring impeachment by convictions in line with the other
rules regulating the use of character evidence to impeach
credibility by restricting inquiry to the witness's character
for veracity and honesty.
Other provisions designed to guard against misuse of
prior convictions to impeach credibility are incorporated into
Rule 609. The Rule reflects sensitivity to problems of remote-
ness,' 3' rehabilitation, 32 and juvenile adjudications. 33 In
129. For instance, if an accused is charged with perjury, the admission of
his last perjury conviction would be highly prejudicial and, if not falling
within certain limited exceptions, would subvert Rule 404(b).
130. In speaking of the scope of the phrase "dishonesty or false state-
ment," Dean Ladd observed that "robbery, larceny, and burglary, while not
showing a propensity to falsify, do disclose a disregard for the rights of
others which might reasonably be expected to express itself in giving false
testimony whenever it would be to the advantage of the witness. If the
witness had no compunctions against stealing another's property or taking it
away from him by physical threat or force, it is hard to see why he would
hesitate to obtain an ,advantage for himself or friend in a trial by giving false
testimony." Credibility Tests at 180.
131. FED. R. EVID. 609(b): "Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not
admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the
conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for
that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in
the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported
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summary, Rule 609 represents a substantial reform of the use
of prior convictions to impeach credibility and will hopefully
be construed to make the impeachment device more suited to
its limited purpose; collateral effects which are the result of a
discarded philosophy should be eliminated. 134
Prior Statements
While the Federal Rules do not exhaustively treat the
subject of impeachment, 3 5 they do articulate the founda-
tional requirements relative to prior statements-of witnesses.
Rule 613(a) 136 abolishes the former rule which required the
cross-examiner, prior to questioning the witness about his
prior written statement, to show it to the witness. 3 7 The
by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial
effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than 10 years old as calculated
herein, is not admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party
sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the
adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence."
132. FED. R. EVID. 609(c): "Evidence of a conviction is not admissible
under this rule if: (1) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annul-
ment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a
finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person has not
been convicted of a subsequent crime which was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the subject
of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of
innocence."
133. FED. R. EvID. 609(d): "Evidence of juvenile adjudications is gener-
ally not admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal
case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the
accused if a conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the
credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is
necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence."
134. Consider the collateral problem of the extent to which the opponent
may inquire into the details of crimes purportedly introduced to impeach the
witness's credibility. In State v. Jackson, 307 So. 2d 604 (La. 1975), the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that all the details, whether their effect is to
minimize or magnify the value of the prior crime as an impeachment device,
are proper subjects of inquiry. However, sound policy should exclude details
of the prior crime, especially if it results in avoidance of other requirements
limiting the admissibility of other crimes to prove knowledge, intent, and the
like. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER 609[03] at 79-80.
135. See text at note 71, supra.
136. FED. R. EVID. 613(a): "In examining a witness concerning a prior
statement made by him, whether written or not, the statement need not be
shown nor its contents disclosed to him at that time, but on request the same
shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel."
137. See generally MCCORMICK § 28.
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rule was a useless impediment to cross-examination and
often operated to protect a collusive witness.138 However,
since the requirement was rarely enforced, 139 its abrogation
is of little significance.
Distinguishable is the situation where, for purposes of
impeachment, a prior inconsistent statement is sought to be
proved in evidence. In Louisiana, as in most jurisdictions, the
cross-examiner is first required to draw the witness's atten-
tion to the time and place of the prior statement and then
give him an opportunity to explain or deny making the
statement before extrinsic proof of the statement is admissi-
ble. 140 Under Rule 613(b) 141 the only remaining requirement is
that the examiner afford the witness an opportunity to ex-
plain the statement and the opposite party an opportunity to
examine the witness about the statement. Since the Federal
Rules do not require that the examiner introduce a witness's
prior inconsistent statement at the first opportunity, several
collusive witnesses may be examined before disclosure of a
joint prior inconsistent statement. 142 Even the relaxed foun-
138. FED. R. EVmD. 613(a), Adv. Comm. Note.
139. MCCORMICK § 29 at 57.
140. LA. R.S. 15:493 (1950) provides: "Whenever the credibility of a wit-
ness is to be impeached by proof of any statement made by him contradictory
to his testimony, he must first be asked whether he has made such state-
ment, and his attention must be called to the time, place and circumstances,
and to the person to whom the alleged statement was made, in order that the
witness may have an opportunity of explaining that which is prima facie
contradictory. If the witness does not distinctly admit making such state-
ment, evidence that he did make it is admissible." See MCCORMICK § 37 at 72.
141. FED. R. EvID. 613(b): "Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent
statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an
opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an
opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise
require. This provision does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as
defined in rule 801(dX2)." Through principles of expression unius est exclusio
alterius, the Rule does not require any foundational pre-requisites to the
admissibility of prior inconsistent conduct. FED. R. EviD. 613(b), Adv. Comm.
Note.
142. FED. R. EVID. 613(b), Adv. Comm. Note. However, the Rule may
conflict with FED. R. CIV. P. art. 26(b)(3) which gives a person the right to
inspect his prior statements about the subject matter of the suit. If the delay
in exposing the prior inconsistent statement operates merely until the wit-
ness is deposed, there should be no serious imposition. But, if Rule 613(b) is
permitted to delay the production of the statements until trial, the policy of
Rule 26(b)(3) will be subverted. Phillips, A Comparative Study of the Witness
Rules in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence and in Tennessee Law, 39
TENN. L. REV. 379, 401-02 (1972).
1975]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
dational requirements of Rule 613(b) need not be met where
the "interests of justice otherwise require.' 1 43
Conclusion
Though Article VI of the Federal Rules of Evidence con-
tains many rules contrary to those obtaining in Louisiana,
they are generally supported by sound policy and could serve
as a model for needed clarification and modernization of
Louisiana evidence law. However, if such a project is under-
taken, certain Louisiana rules should be retained as reflect-
ing a wiser policy judgment. The broad rule of cross-
examination not only conserves judicial time and energy but
is a more effective tool in the truth-finding process than the
narrow rule. Louisiana should also maintain its prohibition of
inquiry into specific instances of a witness's conduct to impeach
his credibility1 44 due to the prejudicial effects which may often
result from disclosure of such facts.
Additionally, various rules in Article VI should be mod-
ified to protect against possible jury exposure to improper
evidence. Unless a policy decision is reached defining all prior
inconsistent statements as non-hearsay, the prosecution's at-
tempts to impeach its own witnesses by prior inconsistent
statements should be limited to instances in which the pros-
ecution is surprised to prevent the surreptitious introduc-
tion of hearsay. Impeachment by use of convictions should be
limited to those crimes involving dishonesty or false state-
ment. Such classification includes any crime having substan-
tial relevance to credibility and will, therefore, exclude those
crimes having slight probative value and most tending to
result in jury prejudice. However, the court should be given
discretion to exclude even convictions having substantial rel-
evance to credibility in order to provide for exceptional situ-
ations where even the strong probative value of this class of
crimes is outweighed by their prejudicial effect.
Robert W. Booksh, Jr.
143. See note 141, supra. E.g., State v. Reed, 290 So. 2d 835 (La. 1974)
(foundation not laid at the preliminary hearing; witness died before trial and
the admitted prior recorded testimony was held not subject to impeachment).
See also FED. R. EVID. 806 which provides in part: "Evidence of a statement
or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with his hearsay
statement, is not subject to any requirement that he may have been afforded
an opportunity to deny or explain."
144. See note 95, supra.
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